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On Rationality 
 
Rationality is an enduring topic of interest across the disciplines and has become even 
more so given the current crises that are unfolding in our society. The four books 
reviewed here, which are written by academics working in economics, political science, 
political theory and philosophy, provide an interdisciplinary engagement with the idea 
of rationality and the way it has shaped the institutional frameworks, and global 
political economy of our time. Rational choice theory has certainly proved to be a useful 
analytic tool in certain contexts, and instrumental reason has been a key tenet of human 
progress in several periods of history, including the industrial revolution and the 
modernity that emerged in the 19th century. Given the complexity of our current 
challenges, however, is it time to ask whether this paradigm might be better 
complemented by more holistic and heterodox approaches? 
Hindmoor, A., Taylor, T.Y., 2015, Rational Choice, 2nd edition. ed. Political analysis. Palgrave Macmillan, 
London; New York, NY 
Massumi, B., 2015. The power at the end of the economy. Duke University Press, Durham.  
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Surrey, UK; Burlington, VT.  
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Introduction  
 
How we choose to read and respond to the big problems of our times such as the crash of 
financial markets or environmental destruction poignantly reveals our priorities and the 
values which we want society to be most characterised by. Rationality has been 
instrumental in policy design, from the target culture introduced in the public sector to 
maximise efficiency, to the way in which we conceptualise individual freedom, and the 
rise of certain political ideologies that emphasise technocratic and allegedly value neutral 
forms of governance based on data collection, feedback loops and algorithmic evaluation: 
an ideology Evgeny Morozov has dubbed 'solutionism' (Morozov, 2013).  
The books under review offer different perspectives on how rationality has been shaped, 
how it functions in our economy, and what it is or can be used for. In this sense, all offer 
themselves as works that might be organised differently in another essay review with other 
texts, perhaps as meditations on the method and philosophy of science, or as contributions 
of political theory and neoliberalism. Taken together, however, they range from offering a 
balanced and thorough introduction to the heated topic area of rational choice theory 
(Hindmoor & Taylor, 2015), to trying to sketch out the invidious effects of neoliberal 
political rationality on democratic political institutions (Brown, 2015), to a philosophical 
critique of key premises underlying rational choice and the emotive aspects in the 
contemporary neoliberal socioeconomic framework (Massumi, 2015), to an attempt to 
reawaken critical theory as a tool to rethink a valid alternative rationality that does not put 
the domination of nature at its centre (Ludovisi, 2015). Although these books have different 
aims, what binds them together is that the assumptions and judgements which are made 
about the applicability of a type of rationality, shapes the way we conceive of society, our 
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role in it, and how we might respond in the future. This is as much true for someone trying 
to offer reasons for the current authoritarian populist surges in Western democracies, to 
those effective altruists arguing about the role evidence-based policy should play in 
directing governments, philanthropists and individuals in giving effectively to charity. 
These debates greatly shape our idea of political science as a richly contested discipline, as 
well illustrated by the outputs in this journal responding to a symposium on Keith 
Dowding’s work (see PSR, May 2017; Dowding, 2017). By implication, however, the 
dominant social science conceived as techne contributes widely to a context-dependent, 
social development and organisation of our political and social institutions, that can work 
either to emancipate or to control (Flyvbjerg, 2001, p. 62). And as such, the question of 
rationality will always pose itself as an enduring topic and one which needs serious 
consideration and robust reflection from as many angles as possible. 
Rational choice 
 
Rational choice is undoubtedly one of the key concepts of political science and has stirred 
some of the most bitter debates and controversies in the field. As Frank Lovett put it: any 
self-respecting social scientist has to have an opinion on rational choice, and debates 
surrounding this framework continue to be ‘something of a cause- célèbre (Lovett, 2006, 
p. 237). It is rare, then, to find an account of the intellectual history of rational choice that 
is so balanced and that provides such a succinct introduction to the historical development 
of this powerful idea as the one provided by Hindmoor and Taylor. Though the absence of 
a discussion about the way in which the Cold War influenced some of its development is 
perhaps a notable omission.   
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Delving deeper into the big questions of political philosophy, the second chapter focuses 
on James Buchanan and his normative political theory on the legitimacy of the state and 
the implications on what sort of state this should be, thus allowing for a clear summary of 
Buchanan and Tullock’s important contribution The Calculus of Consent to emerge. 
Furthermore, Hindmoor and Taylor offer a brief summary and assessment of alternative 
critical views, for instance, that cooperation between actors is possible without resorting to 
the state, as well as how Buchanan's analytical framework may help us understand certain 
political developments such as centralisation of power in American federalism. 
In the next chapter Hindmoor and Taylor look at the way in which rational choice (in 
particular spatial theory of party competition) can contribute to our understanding of 
politics and party behaviour in two party systems such as the UK. The chapter focuses on 
the contributions made by Anthony Downs, who is interestingly interpreted as providing a 
normative defence of representative democracy, and in so doing, discusses the way in 
which our understanding of democracy has changed, as well as varying accounts of 
democratic legitimacy. Here, Hindmoor and Taylor provide a particularly relevant and 
timely discussion on more recent contributions to rational choice literature.  
In the following chapter, they focus their attention on countries like Germany and Belgium, 
where multiparty coalition-building is the norm. Central to this chapter is the work of 
William Riker and a discussion of the tenability of key assumptions such as whether parties 
do converge on the median voter and whether politicians formulate policy to win elections, 
rather than the other way around.  
In the remaining chapters, the authors focus on major exponents of rational choice such as 
Kenneth Arrow and social choice theory, and Mancur Olson and the logic of collective 
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action. It is here that they briefly discuss Nobel Prize winner Elinor Ostrom and her 
research on polycentric governance of common pool resources, demonstrating how the 
governance of resources by communities can often effectively eschew the traditional binary 
solutions to such problems of allocating private property rights via the market, or 
nationalisation by the state. They then discuss rational choice in relation to government 
failure with particular emphasis on Gordon Tullock, before returning to Anthony Downs, 
this time in relation to the economics of information and voter choice. 
In the last chapter, Hindmoor and Taylor discuss the nature of rational choice explanations 
in a wider context in the philosophy of science, discussing positivism, which places 
emphasis on the predictive qualities of theories (which rational choice is deemed to perform 
quite poorly in), and scientific realism, which emphasises the identification of causal 
mechanisms on the other (which rational choice is much better at). They discuss the 
contemporary role of rational choice in light of what appears to be more modest adaptations 
of rational choice theory, which may account for why the intensity of the debate has slightly 
waned in recent years. The question arises, whether we can accept a 'partial universalism' 
of rational choice, meaning that it is a useful analytic tool when certain conditions are 
present, but cannot be used to explain any and all political developments and events.  
Regarding rational choice, a more specific question is to what extent one can meaningfully 
speak of economics as producing scientific results, and how accurate a representation of 
certain social phenomenon can be drawn based upon them. One obvious problem is the 
fact that the assumption of ceteris paribus rarely holds in the social world, and therefore is 
not easily reduced to an observable nexus of effects. Rational choice theorists would do 
well to consider carefully the way they frame their questions: for instance, rather than 
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asking why does X happen if Y and why is that the case, a question which tries to establish 
a law, it might be better to ask why does X seem to happen if Y in some cases and not in 
others. In other words, rational choice theorists are engaged in the pursuit of demi 
regularities rather than laws of social physics. This also means that a lot of the criticisms 
regarding excessive instrumentality of rational choice can be mitigated by pointing out that 
perhaps too much emphasis has been put on the content of the sometimes seemingly rigid 
assumptions of rational choice, rather than the axiomatic structure of preferences. 
Hindmoor and Taylor give a variety of examples to demonstrate that one can coherently 
integrate non instrumental preferences, for instance the aforementioned approaches of 
Elinor Ostrom.  
However, Ostroms's Nobel Prize winning research (incidentally awarded a year after the 
2008 financial crisis) which powerfully debunks the myth of the tragedy of the commons, 
and undermines certain tenets of neoclassical economics and key aspects of rational choice, 
does beg the question how broad a family rational choice theorists can be, while still 
maintaining a recognisable identity. If rational choice theory encapsulates human decision 
making, from the governance of the commons to hedge fund managers, does the target of 
rational choice not become increasingly vague? As the authors point out, first generation 
and second generation rational choice theorists and revisionist public choice theorists are 
far less narrow in their assumptions and less imperialistic in their ambition. The main 
question for social science and it uses of rational choice theory seems then to be, what 
conditions have to be present in order for rational choice theory to be effectively applied, 
and which questions of social science are most closely related these situations?  For 
instance, from a rational choice point of view, one could well provide an analysis which 
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suggests the following: the EU and the UK have a preference ranking that is adverse to the 
national and public interest on both sides of the channel (Varoufakis, 2017). This is because 
the EU, as a conscious optimiser of its own institutional stability and power in self-interest 
of the bureaucrats and politicians who benefit from it, does not want to seek a mutually 
beneficial deal for fear of contagion. On the other hand, the UK under Theresa May has 
seemingly prioritised the ending of free movement, as this policy objective has been 
identified as optimising voter support, thus riding on the tailwind of perceived public 
opinion.  
The transition of rational choice towards becoming a more flexible normative tool rather 
than a set of rigid assumptions (as highlighted in chapters four, five and eight especially) 
that produce predictive power is not without its issues. If empirical success is not the 
standard of proof—if as some defenders have claimed rational choice is like the ambiguous 
lessons one may learn from literature, readily available to apply in one’s life when similar 
contexts or dynamics arise—both proponents and critics of rational choice may feel too 
much of its ambition is shorn with this interpretation.  Indeed for the latter a sense of 
triumphant irony will not escape them, for Adorno and Horkheimer had made clear that 
the ubiquity of positivism had all but been achieved by the 1940s: ‘that which does not 
reduce to numbers, and ultimately the one, becomes illusion: modern positivism writes it 
off as literature’ (Adorno & Horkheimer, 1997, p. 7). Nevertheless, this is perhaps a much 
more fruitful way of looking at the way in which social science, especially economics, 
seeks to encapsulate an understanding of human action. 
Evidence based policy exercises entail forms of quantification—often in the form of risk 
analysis or cost benefit analyses, which aim to optimize one among a set of policy options 
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corresponding to a generally single framing of the issue under consideration. This entails 
not just asymmetries of information but asymmetries of impact, weighted impact that often 
falls hardest on marginalized groups. For example, by utilising performance metrics, 
governments have pursued policies of parental ‘choice’ over school places the past three 
decades, which has resulted in school quality being capitalised in house prices. But making 
schools compete in this way drives up house prices which in turn prohibits any real access 
for disadvantaged pupils (Burgess, Greaves, Vignoles, & Wilson, 2011), and more likely 
only allows affluent groups to take advantage1 (Gibbons & Machin, 2006). This can 
become perverse when these same metrics are used to compare these schools (those 
maintaining a catchment area criterion in their admission policy), to faith schools which 
are not bound by it. It is no secret that successive governments, taking note of their above 
average results, have long been enthralled by the faith school ‘silver bullet’.  
This exemplifies that economics is not an exact science but a tool to consolidate or 
undermine political ideologies and power—which links to a distinction made by Hindmoor 
and Taylor about the relatively recent separation between political economy and 
economics. For instance, whether one thinks that economic growth comes from savings, or 
stimulating aggregate demand matters because it determines whether a government gives 
a tax cut to corporations and “savvy investors”, or the broader public. It is not clear that 
there is a scientific finding in economics that can sway government policy one way or 
another.  
                                                 
1 Butler et al give an example where a middle class family, ideologically opposed to private education, 
ended up buying an investment home in their preferred comprehensive school’s catchment area in order to 
send their child there (Butler, Hamnett, & Ramsden, 2013).  
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Affect meets rational choice 
 
If Hindmoor and Taylor's book is a relatively well-balanced overview of rational choice 
and its discontents, Brian Massumi's The Power at the End of the Economy is a scathing 
critique of the neoliberal political economy: ‘a rabbit hole appears at the heart of the 
market. It plummets from the apparently solid ground of rational choice to a wonderland 
where nothing appears the same. Affect is its name’ (2015, p. 4). His analysis is not just a 
critique of a particular political or economic regime as such, but it can be seen as a 
philosophical reflection on the emotional fabric of capitalism; the inner dynamics of what 
Keynes famously dubbed the 'animal spirits', and the formation of the subject in relation to 
a socioeconomic structure within.  Rooted in constructivism, poststructuralist thought, 
systems theory, and cognitive psychology, readers familiar with Gilles Deleuze will no 
doubt recognise the theoretical debt owed to him, and the way in which he draws from 
similar sources such as Michel Foucault, David Hume, Gilbert Simondon and Lewis 
Caroll’s Alice in Wonderland. On the other hand, readers less familiar with this theoretical 
framework may find it difficult to untangle the, at times, opaque postmodern prose.  
A key starting point for him is Foucault’s' The Birth of Biopolitics, from which he analyses 
how neoliberalism pushes discipline beyond the individual subject to construct new forms 
of control. Massumi argues that the perpetual tension between seeking trust in a system, (a 
secure ground), and the ever-present knowledge in the back of one's mind that precisely 
this trust is absent, creates the conditions of possibility for a pre-emptive Foucauldian 
biopolitics, that ‘primes’ the subject into a condition of passive receptiveness.  
The power of the political regime then, resides in relational stability, which is a key 
condition necessary for socioeconomic structures to reproduce themselves. This is brought 
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about by what Massumi calls 'ontopower', which is characterised by the complex web of 
interrelated human choices and the constant back-and-forth dynamic of affect and 
rationality. Indeed, a key argument of the book is that affect and rationality cannot be 
genuinely separated in any meaningful way.  
In the second chapter, Massumi reinforces this philosophical insight with empirical results 
from cognitive psychology. The point is that decisions emerge from a specific context of 
choice, and not the autonomous rationality we have learned to hail since the Enlightenment. 
Decisions are therefore intuitive rather than a rational calculus. The parallel here to the 
pandemonium of finance capital and its ravaging strides of irrational exuberance, flying in 
the in face of the alleged rational market coordination of human actions via price signals 
and markets, is clear. Massumi wants us to transcend this binary opposition between 
intuition and rational choice and instead envision ourselves as simultaneously thinking-
feeling, fully embodied beings. In some ways, the creative impulse embodied joy and 
human connection of affect, are compressed out of existence by the corset of instrumental 
reason, to which our affective energies are increasingly channelled towards: ‘figures are 
released monthly and, in the case of the most affectively weighted and eagerly awaited, 
quarterly’ (Massumi, 2015, p. 12).  
In the third chapter, drawing on Alfred North Whitehead, Massumi tries to envision, or 
indeed asks, how a political regime might emerge in which the 'affective event' can grow 
on fertile ground. In this event, rather than disrupting from the outside like Alain Badiou’s 
militant, Massumi places emphasis on the 'activist', who forges trans-individual sympathy, 
and whose momentum can (he hopes) resonate with wider society.  
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Neoliberal rationality 
 
Wendy Brown situates her Undoing the Demos as a work of political theory elucidating 
the ‘arc and mechanisms through which neoliberalism’s novel construction of persons and 
states are evacuating democratic principles, eroding democratic institutions and 
eviscerating the democratic imaginary’ (Brown, 2015, pp. 27–28). She is principally 
concerned for the prospects of popular democracy when neoliberal reason ‘configures both 
soul and city as contemporary firms, rather than as polities’, and for the health of 
democracy’s constituent components of culture, subjects, principles and institutions (p. 
27). Following a substantive introduction, the book is split into three theoretical chapters 
and a further two examples of neoliberal practice emptying the core features of democratic 
civic life. The first of these case-studies is a consideration of the legal system and free 
speech, and the second is about the decimation of liberal arts courses in US higher 
education. This is followed by an epilogue that provides a positive case for popular 
democracy given its contingent and precarious arrangement in our current society. 
Like Massumi, Brown finds much resource in Foucault’s The Birth of Biopolitics, in 
crafting neoliberalism as a comprehensive political rationality and not just an economic 
policy. Chapter two, in particular, is heavily indebted to Foucault’s insight of neoliberalism 
as a remaking of the liberal art of government. Foucault allows one to make the point that 
the full-throated lilt of neoliberalist policy in the 1980s was not simply an overturning of 
Keynesian welfare economics, but rather the seeds for a powerful governing rationality had 
been established through the fact ‘its worms lived in the bowels of hegemonic 
Keynesianism’ (Brown, 2015, p. 51). It is possible to think of Roosevelt’s welfare policy 
in the 1930s which pursued economic ‘artificial voluntarist interventions’ into the market 
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to guarantee democratic freedoms such as consumption and political freedom, which was 
threatened by unemployment (Foucault, 2008, p. 68).  
Chapter three revises Foucault’s conception of the modern subjectivity of man. Foucault 
confirms a double-persona made up of economic and juridical-legal (p. 85): namely a 
subject of interest and of right. Brown contends that this story eclipses homo politicus, an 
enduring and present feature throughout political theory from Aristotle, to Smith, 
Rousseau, Hegel, Marx and even Freud, and only conspicuously batted away with the 
neoliberal conversion of ‘citizen-subject’ to ‘economic-being’ (p. 108). Hindmoor and 
Taylor themselves, for instance, begin their book by acknowledging it was political 
economy that generated such classic texts as Wealth of the Nations and Utilitarianism 
(2015, p. 7), and that the separation of politics and economics is only a recent division.  
In the remaining chapters, Brown focuses her attention on the deleterious effects of 
neoliberal rationality on higher education and free speech. She laments that liberal arts 
programmes are increasingly difficult to argue for as public goods, and the language 
embedded in these courses such as ‘equality’, ‘autonomy’ and ‘freedom’ are ‘giving way 
to economic valences of these terms’ (p. 177). Graduates are conceived as investing in their 
human capital, rather than developing as scholars or public citizens, and subject knowledge 
is sought primarily for capital advancement. In the broader polity, speech becomes 
conceived as unregulated capital which best serves members of a political market when it 
is freely available. Brown draws on the Citizens United case where the Supreme Court 
ruled corporations as citizens. Such a move takes speech away from the process of 
deliberation and judgement, to a place where ‘ideas, opinions and ultimately, votes are 
generated by speech’, just as marketplace goods are generated by capital (p. 158).  
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Brown is fond of her ‘hollowing out’ metaphor to characterise neoliberalism’s assault on 
the civic and the political institutions. ‘Hollowing out’ places much emphasis on the 
capacity to leave nothing but a fragile outer shell—no doubt an apt summation of the state 
of many of our democratic institutions. This image, however, underplays neoliberalism’s 
malleability in reconfiguring itself within institutional domains in more complex ways, 
such as when social actors are actively responsibilised and asked to negotiate conflicting 
worldviews. Brown does gesture to this point in her discussion of Rowen Shamir’s work 
on the economisation of the moral (chapter 4). In such a wide-ranging book, however, even 
more could be said about the way neoliberalism often sustains itself by reconfiguring the 
language of social justice and equity, rather than simply diminishing it. 
Critical theory and praxis  
 
Whereas Brown situates her book as a theoretical contribution to the critique of 
neoliberalist rationality, Stefano Giacchetti Ludovisi’s collected volume puts the question 
of praxis at its centre. The book is compiled of chapters developed in the context of a series 
of International Critical Theory Conferences held in Rome since 2010, which have 
endeavoured to construct a ‘new political reality’ grounded on the early Frankfurt School, 
as a way of ‘originating alternative models of political praxis’ (Ludovisi, 2015, p. 3). The 
book is organised into three sections. Firstly, Adorno and his works, are addressed in 
relation to their potential convergence with political praxis. This is followed by sections on 
reconciling critical theory with ‘normativity and a theory of rights and justice’ (p. 3) and a 
final two chapters discuss the relationship between aesthetics and politics. 
The book devotes five chapters in attempting to reconcile Adorno’s theory with a potential 
praxis: a labour that falls short of offering the reader a procedural, programmatic form of 
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praxis. A substantial re-reading of Adorno is produced by Ludovisi himself who states that 
through his radical critique of alienation and reification, Adorno’s theory fosters a ‘critical 
consciousness that can lead us to the refusal of complicity in domination’ (Ludovisi, 2015, 
p. 35). Critical thought is thus conceived as practice: a ‘transformative’ and ‘practical 
productive force’ (p. 35). Overall, Adorno’s ‘dialectics’ is understood in these chapters to 
provide us with an invaluable way to raise consciousness through reflection ‘against the 
administered world’, or even the current ‘anti-Jewish rabble’ found in Europe (chapter by 
Dobbs-Weinstein, p. 87), even though this cannot constitute a programmatic form of 
praxis. In spite of all the risks Adorno took in ‘affirming absolute autonomy of thought’, a 
‘solid political theory’ for social change, transformed by praxis, is unlikely to ever emerge 
(Ludovisi, 2015, p. 60).  
The latter chapters position critical theory as an explanatory tool for thinking about the 
issue of institutional transformation rights and justice. Habermas is a key figure here in 
mobilising the normativity needed to positively discuss such issues with his 
communicative discourse, and he appears in a number of chapters. Rocio Zambrana’s 
chapter begins by drawing on Habermas’ belief that Dialectics of Enlightenment had 
formed an ambiguity, or still worse a political pessimism in critical theory (p. 101). This 
was something established by the 1940s, when neither Adorno or Horkheimer believed that 
social science methods could ‘fulfil the promises of critical social theory’, thus leading to 
the radicalisation and totalisation of their critique of ideology that is found in their Dialectic 
of Enlightenment (Habermas & Levin, 1982, p. 21). Zambrana’s chapter thus reinstates a 
‘normative ambivalence’, firstly, through her reading of Dialectic of Enlightenment as ‘a 
powerful perspective’ for analysing the paradoxical logic of capitalist modernisation (p. 
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102) and via a decolonial critique of reason provided by Columbian scholar Santiago 
Castro-Gómez, whose work introduces heterogeneity and cultural negotiation into the fray, 
thus breaking the Weberian conception of one rationality and one modernity. In rejecting 
the opposition between traditional and popular culture in Latin America, this allows for a 
reading of rationalisation unfolding ‘in a different way in a particular context’, and where 
Latin American identities are a result of multiple rationalities that transform one another 
(p. 110).  
The edited collection is rounded up with two chapters that discuss the relationship between 
aesthetics and politics. One deals with Adorno’s relationship with Benjamin, the other 
draws on his critical engagement with Hegel.  This latter chapter discusses a recent video 
installation by the German filmmaker Hito Steyerl’s entitled Adorno’s Grey, a title alluding 
to the (probably) apocryphal story that Adorno had his lecture hall painted grey to allow 
his students to better concentrate. Adorno is notoriously read as proclaiming that 
philosophy could only be realised ‘via unremitting negativity’, via art that refused to be 
made ‘a functional part of the existing order’ (p. 202). Hito Steyerl’s exhibit supposedly 
brings us away from this. Adorno’s retreat away from any radical politics to theory might 
support this reading further. Samir Gandesha’s chapter however, contends that the radical 
student’s actions during the 1960s, although wrong in their use of violence, actually 
followed literally the logic of wanting to smash reified consciousness, an idea captured by 
Adorno’s belief that aesthetic theory could provide the ‘explosive Dionysian impulse’ 
when it aims to ‘express the inexpressible’ (p. 203). In completing the circle, the exhibition 
ends with film footage of a student using Adorno’s book Negative Dialectics, to break out 
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of the police line. Rather than suppressing praxis, philosophy and politics are given 
expression through their intertwinement of art.  
In fact, this ‘Dionysian impulse’ seems also to be present in Brian Massumi’s ‘activist’, 
who surrenders himself artfully to ‘the event’ and in relation to others, thus combating 
liberal individualism by creating broader channels of solidarity and sympathy that go 
beyond interest. He cites the Arab Spring, the Quebec student movement, and Occupy Wall 
Street as potential examples. But he is also acutely aware that the affective life cycles of 
these moments of revolutionary potential mean that their momentum can always be 
subdued or appropriated by the existing regime, most poignantly demonstrated by the 
appropriation of the 1960s counter culture. Perhaps then, one should not primarily focus 
on these explosive events which always leaves the perpetually unanswered question of 
what to do the morning after, but instead, identify sites which broader subjectivities of 
solidarity can emerge and whose moral and political demands may resonate with wider 
society.  
As David Graeber (2014) has pointed out, many people in the Occupy Wall Street 
movement in the US were workers in the care sector who were not making ends meet, and 
were inhibited from contributing to doing what they wanted to do, in providing an 
invaluable service to society—something which should surely be a political and moral end 
worth striving for regardless of ones’ position on the spatial voting grid. We can see here 
how the marginalisation of affective labour, (either through lack of valuation or in the 
‘taken-for-granted’ in the case of domestic labour on which the entire reproduction of the 
economy depends), discloses a systemic inequality. Thus, affect becomes the locus of a 
political demand which is specific enough, but has a potential to trigger wider political 
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friction given it calls into question some of the key structural mechanisms of capital 
valuation chains. In some ways, Obamacare did something very similar: a modest demand 
triggered a much bigger ethico-political debate with potential larger implications for the 
US economy. This is perhaps the art of politics today.  
Rational choice in our time  
 
Ideas often capture the public and policy-makers and are more powerful than is commonly 
understood. As Keynes famously wrote: ‘practical men who believe themselves to be quite 
exempt from any intellectual influence, are usually the slaves of some defunct economist’. 
This is certainly true for rational choice’s enthusiastic take up by politicians. It is worth 
reminding ourselves that during what Hindmoor and Taylor characterise as rational 
choice’s ‘difficult decade’ (1994-2004), third-way politicians such as Bill Clinton and 
Tony Blair were busy enacting its very tenets more than ever as guides for delivering 
‘effective’ evidence-based policy, something the former UK government advisor Michael 
Barber characterised as the science of ‘policy deliverology’. New Labour embodied that 
ever-increasing move towards a rationalist, apolitical form of policy-making, which fixated 
on ‘what works’, at the expense of arguing what politics might be for. This piecemeal 
approach to politics, however, arguably seeps its way further down the chain to institutional 
practices too.  
For instance, during many of his speeches as UK Education Secretary, Michael Gove 
referred to the art of teaching, asking how one might ‘quantify good citizenship’, ‘calibrate 
team spirit’ or ‘measure enthusiasm or love of learning’ (Gove, 2011a). In the same year, 
however, he recounted a visit to an academy chain that routinely measured each child’s 
progress every half-term to see where they ranked in relation to the rest of their peers, in 
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their subjects, for their sporting and cultural achievement and effort overall (Gove, 2011b). 
This is done first in private, giving each pupil a chance to improve their standing, before 
being made public to the other pupils and parents. This logic is reminiscent of national 
performance tables and the ‘intelligent accountability’ systems that have become a 
ubiquitous feature of schooling infrastructures nowadays.  
As the example suggests, when pupils and teachers fall into this rationalist domain, it 
reminds us of one of the criticisms that Massumi makes when he laments that the affective 
and relational potential of humans is restricted, in order to maximise their effective, 
measurable outputs. This seems ironic given that neoliberalism champions an autonomy 
for the individual and freedom of choice: including greater freedom for public servants to 
realise their goals. This is symptomatic of a wider trend in neoliberalist rationality, that 
while we are given an even greater freedom of choice, the ways in which these decisions 
are framed, are increasingly becoming less transparent and less democratic. Whilst the 
teacher might be given more choice about how to achieve certain ends, the choices 
available become limited within a framework of ‘professional autonomy’. Once again 
though, it is important to ask whether one can separate the aim of methodological 
soundness with the knock-on effect rational choice has had on institutional contexts. Our 
more general point is that rational choice has at least been a key component of the promise 
of political atheism. Rational choice may often be framed as a methodological choice, but 
its adoption must ultimately be conceived as a political choice or is at least appropriated 
by those who have clear policy agendas. The separation between political economy and 
economics can be seen as an attempt to disguise the political power and ideology entailed 
within economic models and theory. If one follows the neoclassical economics school, 
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inflation is the key variable that has to be stabilised. If one follows the Keynesian school, 
unemployment is the key policy objective. In many ways, the current crises of 
neoliberalism and the rise of populism on the left and the right, that ride on the wave of 
anti-globalisation sentiment, can in part be explained by the ‘great transformation’ from a 
political economy that was centred around labour, to one that increasingly protected 
inflation. That is, the move towards protecting financial assets, setting up global supply 
chains that further weakened the position of labour, and ultimately the deregulation of 
financial markets as a key ingredient to providing economic prosperity. 
The technocratic depersonalising rational calculus governmentality that has been 
characterised in this article is growing ever stronger, and more libertarian than before (see 
Finlayson, 2017).  Both Brexit and Trump strengthened a small minority with a very strong 
ideology (as John Major, in reference to former put it). Their agenda can be summarised 
as opposing public service professionals, public choice style scepticism of public servants 
and politicians, thus seeking to ‘hollow out’ (as Brown might put it) axiological political 
considerations and ideas, with mechanistic, self-optimising technocratic solutions, that all 
too often are reliant on data. Of course, there is nothing politically neutral about this 
ideology; it is quite clear that the championing of the entrepreneurial society, (one only has 
to look at some of the key individuals behind Brexit and Trump: Arron Banks, Dominic 
Cummings and Trump advisor and billionaire Peter Thiel) is anything but politically 
atheistic (Dowd, 2017). The most recent tax cuts of Trump show that he is not representing 
the interests of those who were key to his electoral success, despite resonating on traditional 
leftist themes such as anti-globalisation. In the UK, reports of stripping work time 
directives (O’Grady, 2017), embedding EU law into UK law will surely result in the 
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diminishing of the European legacy of social democracy in favour of greater economic 
liberalization (Fox, 2017) and implementation of a more libertarian worldview, even if the 
European Commission and Franco-German concerns over the power of the city as well as 
basic economic and geo-political realities may make the hard Brexit that these proponents 
of a ‘Shanghai on the edge of Europe’ difficult to achieve.  
In 1979, Michel Foucault remarked that there were ‘many signs’ that we were living under 
a new form of governing rationality in the form of Liberalism, ‘a new calculation on the 
scale of the world’(Foucault, 2008, p. 20). Whatever discipline an author writes from, it 
would be hard to deny that for the past thirty years that this Liberalism has been the 
backdrop. In the context of a complexification as a result of the financial crisis and our 
endeavour to fix the other big challenges of our time, these books combined, provide us 
with many interesting angles for better understanding the consequences of this fact 
(whether they may be positive or negative). In turn, they help us to think about what this 
has meant for our politics, our economics (or rather our political economy) and the 
organisation of our institutions. They help us ask the question, whether we as embodied 
beings can even divide affect and rationality as cleanly as we often imagine, and to ask 
ourselves how much of our social life we want to be thoroughly characterised by a 
rationality that seeks to measure and quantify. 
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